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The Development of Tibetan Scholasticism:  
Shakya Chokden’s History of Madhyamaka 
Thought in Tibet  
Serdok Paṇchen Shakya Chokden (1428–1507) stands out as one 
of the most remarkable thinkers of Tibet. The enormous body of 
his collected works is notable for the diversity and originality of the 
writings it contains, and for their exceptional rigor. One of the few 
Tibetan intellectuals affiliated with both the Sakyapa and Kagyiipa 
orders, which were often doctrinal and political rivals (see chapters 
7 and n), he was also among the sharpest critics of Jé Tsongkhapa 
(chapter 16), the founder of the Gelukpa order that would come to 
dominate Tibet under the Dalai Lamas. For this reason Shakya Chok-
den’s works were eventually banned by the Central Tibetan govern-
ment. They are known to us today primarily thanks to a beautifully 
produced eighteenth-century manuscript from Bhutan, where the 
Central Tibetan ban did not extend and the religious leadership was 
congenial to the blend of Sakyapa and Kagyüpa perspectives that 
lent Shakya Chokden’s texts much of their unique flavor.
Among the distinctive aspects of Shakya Chokden’s oeuvre are 
his several contributions to the history of Buddhist thought. Histori-
cal writing in Tibet (chapter 11) was interested above all in important 
political or religious events, and the lives of the major actors. Doc-
trinal or intellectual history was generally ignored, no doubt in part 
because the outlook fostered in the monastic colleges was one of 
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perennialism: the truths revealed in the Buddha’s teaching were eter-
nal, and thus exempt from the process of historical change. Knowl-
edgeable scholars were, of course, aware that commentarial and in-
terpretive traditions did have a history of sorts, but this awareness 
tended to be expressed in their own commentarial notes, not in ded-
icated doctrinal histories. In Shakya Chokden’s writings, however, we 
find sustained historical essays on Indian and Tibetan traditions of 
logic and epistemology, and of the Madhyamaka philosophy inspired 
by Nāgārjuna. The selections given here are drawn from his work on 
the latter, and may serve as an introductory guide to the philosoph-
ical writings included in the remainder of this chapter. 
Shakya Chokden’s discussion turns on the distinction made by Ti-
betan thinkers between two types of argument, termed in the pres-
ent translation “autonomous reason” and “consequence.” The first re-
fers to the method of using positive proof to demonstrate the truth 
or falsehood of a given proposition. The second, by contrast, only 
seeks to undermine the propositions advanced by a (real or pre-
sumed) opponent by drawing out their untenable consequences, and 
so is similar to reductio ad absurdum, or “indirect proof,” in Western 
systems of logic. This distinction was often considered by Tibetans 
to be the basis for designating two distinct schools of Madhyamaka 
philosophy, Svatantrika (Autonomous Reasoning) and Prasangika 
(Consequentialist). 
—M.T. Kapstein   
How the Tradition Pioneered by Nāgārjuna and his Followers 
Appeared in the Land of Nobles (India) 
As Nāgārjuna said in the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning: “With the origin 
of all faults, nonexistence, having been abandoned, listen to that rea-
soning by which existence is also abandoned .... “ It is explained that 
“the Protector Nāgārjuna  three times roared with a lion’s roar on the 
earth.” It is well known that “first Nāgārjuna  composed the treatises 
of the Collection of Discourses which primarily explain the side of the 
extensive deeds; next he composed the treatises of the Collection of 
Reasoning which primarily explain the dharma of the profound view 
as the emptiness related to severing superimpositions by listening and 
thinking; and finally he composed the Bodhicitta Commentary, Praise 
to the Mind Vajra, etc., which primarily explain emptiness which is 
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experienced through meditation.” Āryadeva, holding the traditions of 
all of these with equal emphasis, became his main holy son. He com-
posed many treatises such as Four Hundred Stanzas and so forth. 
It is known that the holder of his tradition, the Fearless Dharmapāla, 
composed treatises explaining the intents of the above-mentioned fa-
ther and son as “mere knowing.”1 He did this in accordance with the 
way of interpreting the intent of the Second Wheel of Dharma by the 
means of the Third Wheel of Dharma, as it appears in the Sūtras of 
the Third Wheel of Dharma themselves.2 It is known that the Propo-
nents of Entitylessness responded to this interpretation with sarcasm, 
explaining: “If, in spite of having distinguished the two truths, great 
charioteers [the major philosophers] were deluded, there is no need 
even to mention others,” etc. 
The meaning of these words is as follows: “False truth3 has to be 
explained in accordance with worldly conventions. That is the Mad-
hyamaka tradition. But you explained it as mere knowing. That which 
is temporarily explained as ultimate truth finally also has to be ex-
plained as false truth, since it does not withstand analysis by reason-
ing. But you always explain ultimate truth as mere knowing. This is 
a mistake.” Which of these two opinions accords with the way of pos-
iting the definitive meaning in Vajrayāna [Tantric Buddhism] will be 
analyzed below.  
The disciples of Nāgārjuna  who came next are known as Buddha-
pālita and Bhāviveka. They agree in classifying the Collection of Rea­
soning explanatory style as exclusively that of the tradition of the Pro-
ponents of Entitylessness. In that context, they agree in explaining 
that “all objects of knowledge are empty of their own entity.” 
1 “Mere Knowing,” often termed “Mind Only,” or Yogācāra (“Yoga Practice”), also 
refers to the philosophy of mind of the fourth-fifth century teachers Asanġa and 
Vasu bandhu, by whom Dharmapāla was inspired. 
2 The discourses of the Buddha are sometimes classified into three “wheels,” ac-
cording to their subject matter and philosophical outlook. The First Wheel corre-
sponds to the early Buddhist teachings of impermanence, suffering, and absence 
of self; the Second Wheel to the teaching of emptiness elaborated in the “Perfec-
tion of Wisdom” sūtras of the Mahāyāna; and the Third Wheel to the doctrines 
of buddha nature, luminous mind, and gnosis found in other Mahāyāna sūtras. 
3 Though this expression seems an oxymoron, it refers to apparent truth as known 
in the world, which comes to be seen as false when the ultimate is realized.      
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There are two types of entity. A pillar (for example) being empty 
of pillar means a pillar being empty of false entity. Emptiness under-
stood as that pillar being empty of itself is temporarily posited as the 
ultimate nature of a pillar. But if that emptiness in its turn is analyzed 
by reasoning, it will also be found to be empty of itself. Thus a pil-
lar is empty of an ultimate entity as well. In this way, since both en-
tities are not seen in a pillar, it also does not exist. But then it is not 
accepted as nonexistent either, because “existence” — the basis of de-
pendence of “nonexistence” — is not accepted. Interpretation applying 
such a method to all objects of knowledge is the common tradition of 
Proponents of Entitylessness. As their source they use the following 
passages: “If nonempty were a little existent, empty would also be-
come a little existent,” and “One phenomenon is the entity of all phe-
nomena.” Those teachers, who composed the Madhyamaka commen-
taries, arrive at the same identification of the meaning of emptiness, 
the object to be determined. But their way of determining emptiness 
is different. The difference is as follows. 
Autonomous Reasoning (Svātantrika) Madhyamaka 
First, when the master Buddhapālita was commenting on the mean-
ing of [Nāgārjuna’s words] “Neither from self nor from other ... ,” 
he wrote: “It is said that phenomena which exist in their nature also 
don’t need production; if something exists yet gets produced, it will be 
never produced,” etc. The master Bhāviveka wrote the following ref-
utation of this line of reasoning: “It is not reasonable because (a) the 
reason and example are not stated, (b) the fault of what others have 
said is not eliminated, and (c) since these are the words of the con-
sequence, by reversing the given meaning, the reversed meaning of a 
probandum and its predicate becomes clear [i.e., things are not pro-
duced from self], and thus phenomena will turn out to be produced 
from other and contradiction with your tenets will arise.” 
The meaning of this is as follows: “Is the reasoning, with which 
Buddhapālita  was refuting the Sāṃ khyas,4 used as autonomous reason 
4 The non-Buddhist Sāṃ khya school of Indian philosophy held that the effect is in 
some sense already latent in the cause, to which the Buddhists objected that this 
would imply that what came into existence already existed, so that its coming-to-
be implied a c0I1tradiction.      
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or consequence? If it is the first, then there is the fault of proof and 
example being the same. If it is the second, it is also faulty: Conse-
quence which does not imply autonomous reason cannot prouuce in-
ferential understanding. If it implies that reason, then production [i.e., 
production from other] must be accepted as the reversed meaning of 
the consequence. Thus it will become production in the frame of ulti-
mate reasoning. Then it will contradict Madhyamaka tenets.”  
Everybody who holds the explanatory lineage of this master in that 
way is known as [adhering to] Autonomous Reasoning [Svātantrika] 
Mādhyamika. That group has two further subdivisions: one which 
comes from Śrīgupta, Jñānagarbha, etc., and one which comes from 
the bodhisattva Śāntaraksịta and his spiritual son [Kamalaśīla]. They 
are called Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Mādhyamika re-
spectively in the Notes on the View composed by the Great Translator 
Yeshé-dé [ninth century]. 
The main treatises composed by these teachers are: the root text 
and the autocommentary of Engaging in Two Truths by Jñānagarbha, 
the root text and the autocommentary of Madhyamaka Ornament by 
the bodhisattva Śāntarakṣita, and the treatise of Madhyamaka Vi­
sion by his disciple Kamalaśīla. These texts are known as the Three 
Madhya maka Treatises of Eastern Svātantrikas. They were translated 
and their meaning was determined at the earlier time of the Dharma 
king Tri Songdetsen. The Great Translator Ngok composed many com-
mentaries of abbreviated meaning and word meaning on those trea-
tises, and the explanatory lineage of those commentaries survived un-
broken up to the present time. It has yet to be determined whether 
the Great Translator studied these treatises in India or with his uncle 
[Ngok Lekpé Sherap]. 
One of the followers of Śāntarakṣita is the master Haribhadra. He 
interpreted the meaning of the Mother [Prajñāpāramitā, the Perfec-
tion of Wisdom] according to the Yogācāra approach. Thus, everybody 
in the Land of Snows agrees that in his method of refutation of grasp-
ing at signs he used the reasoning of the Proponents of Entitylessness, 
while he explained the object of meditative experience in terms of the 
Yogācāra tradition. 
Similarly, the Great Translator commented that Śāntarakṣita and 
his spiritual son had taught that the intent of the author of the Com­
mentary on Valid Cognition [i.e., Dharmakīrti] was to explain the way 
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of severing superimpositions in terms of the self-emptiness reasoning 
(such as the reason of separation from one and many, etc.) and the ob-
ject of meditative experience in terms of the mode of other-emptiness. 
The Great Translator himself also asserted the intent of the Commen­
tary on Valid Cognition in the same way. 
The Lord of Reasoning Chapa (Chökyi Senggé, 1109-1169) taught 
that the Sautrāntika and Cittamātra [“Mind Only”] traditions tempo-
rarily presented in the Seven Pramāṇa texts [of Dharmakīrti] are not 
suitable to express the actual intent of the author of the Commentary 
on Valid Cognition. Thus, he explained that emptiness, in terms of both 
being determined through reasoning and experienced in meditation, 
is exclusively that emptiness which is a nonaffirming negation  [i.e., 
a negation with no positive entailments]. This is just a brief account 
of the explanatory approach of Autonomous Reasoning (Svātantrika) 
Madhyamaka.   
Consequence (Prasangika) Madhyamaka  
It is known that the beginning of the explanatory tradition of what 
is commonly known as Prāsaṅgika is dated from the time when the 
Glorious Candrakīrti introduced a rebuttal to the faults ascribed to 
Buddhapālita by Bhāviveka. According to him, Buddhapālita’s assertion 
lies in consequence, which Bhāviveka did not explain. Candra’s expla-
nation of the points which Bhāviveka didn’t understand is as follows: 
• If a person is a Madhyamaka follower, he does not make a refu-
tation with autonomous proofs for his own statements; neither 
does he create consequences which imply a reversed meaning of 
an opponent’s statements. This is because when one engages in 
pondering the ultimate mode of abiding, there is no acceptance 
of one’s statements, and if there is such an acceptance one will 
fall into the extremes of conceptual elaborations. So, the reason-
ings refuting Buddhist and non-Buddhist extremists are: “infer-
ential cognition known to others,” “consequence revealing contra-
dictions,” “equalizing by similar reasons,” and “nonestablishment 
due to the similarity of the proof and thesis.” With these reason-
ings it is enough just to refute in one’s mind the assertions of an 
opponent’s statements. One does not have to generate the infer-
ential valid cognition ascertaining one’s own statements. 
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Regarding these explanations, later Svātantrika teachers taught 
that Bhāviveka’s explanatory approach cannot be undermined by as-
cribing to, as its consequence, the fault of illusion established through 
ultimate reasoning. This is because when the object of negation, a 
mass of conceptualization, is negated, its opposite, the absence of con-
ceptualization, is also negated. 
In that context, both Prāsanġika and Svātantrika arrive at nonaf-
firming negation of the whole mass of conceptualization. No differ-
ence in subtlety is accepted in that negation. Later Tibetans explain 
the difference between Prāsanġika and Svātantrika in another way 
and thus deviate from correct explanation.
How Autonomous Reasoning Madhyamaka Came to Tibet 
It is clear that at the earlier time of the Dharma king Tri Songdetsen, 
when the Three Madhyamaka Treatises of the Eastern Svātantrikas 
were translated, just a brief explanatory tradition of those texts 
emerged. But the person who extremely clearly determined them 
through listening and explaining was Ngok Loden Sherap: “Beyond 
the eastern sea, at the edge of nomad lands, there will come an In-
telligent One [Loden], different from Lohita. In his name, Wisdom 
[Sherap] is at the end. Likewise, the Snow Land in the North .... “ 
That great being, prophesied by this and other Sūtras, greatly clarified 
Svātantrika through many commentaries. Among many holders of his 
explanatory tradition, the main one was Khyung Rinchen Drak. Among 
his disciples, known as Cyamar Jangchup Drakpa, Cangpa Sheu, etc., 
Drolungpa Lodrö Jungné was the holder of the tradition of all the ex-
cellent words of that great individual. Chapa Chökyi Senggé stud-
ied with both that Drolungpa and Cyamar Jangchup Drakpa. He com-
posed many commentaries on the excellent words in general, and 
many on the Three Treatises of the Eastern Svatantrikas in particu-
lar. The words of explanations of the Dharmas of Maitreya and Mad-
hyamaka by that teacher came down to Tsek Wangchuk Sengge. From 
him, they were received by Sakya Panḍ̣ita, by whom they were passed 
down to Uyukpa, who passed them to Zhang Dodepa and others. From 
that lineage they came to the Lord of Dharma, Lama Dampa, and then 
reached Rinpoché Yakpa.
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How Consequence Madhyamaka Came to Tibet 
Atiśa said: “The follower of Nāgārjuna  is Candrakīrti. With instruc-
tions passed down from him, the truth of reality is realized.” Thus, 
although at the time when Jowo Atiśa came to Tibet, the texts of 
Candrakīrti himself were not actually translated, Atiśa composed sep-
arate small treatises, such as the Thorough Distinction of the Two 
Truths, etc., explaining Candrakīrti’s intent. Atiśa taught them to the 
virtuous spiritual friend Dromtönpa. Then, in the text on the Stages 
of the Path of the Three Individuals,5 he used Candrakīrti’s tradition 
as the basis for the presentation of the factors of the profound view; 
this approach has survived until today. 
The tradition of the actual commentaries on Candrakīrti’s texts be-
gins with Nyima Drak of the Patsap family in Penyül Gyel. He studied 
in India and Kashmir for twenty-three years, and invited to Tibet three 
paṇḍitas—Kanakavarman and others. In Rasa Trülnang [the Jokhang 
Temple of Lhasa] and other places, he translated many of Candrakīrti’s 
texts in general, and in particular translated and determined by ex-
planation and study Nāgārjuna’s Root Wisdom, Candrakīrti’s Engag­
ing in the Middle Way, Āryadeva’s Four Hundred, and so forth. It is 
known that he was active at the same time as the spiritual friend, the 
Great Sharawa, was engaged in explanation and study of Perfection 
of Wisdom, and when the Lord Düsum Khyenpa [1110-1193, the first 
Karmapa hierarch] was  practicing in Jazang Drak. The Great Shar-
awa created many favorable conditions for Translator Patsap’s schol-
arly activities and encouraged his own intelligent disciples to study 
Madhyamaka with Patsap.  
At that time there were four disciples known as the Four Sons of 
Patsap. Learned in both words and meaning was Mapcha Jangchup 
Tsöndrü. They also say that he might be the same person as Cha-
pa’s disciple Mapcha Tsöpé Senggé. Learned in words was Sarbö from 
Tsang. They say that a small number of monks who followed his style 
of study and teaching existed in the Nyang region. Learned in meaning 
5 This is Atiśa’s major work, the Lamp on the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhi­
pathapradīpa), which teaches that there are three grades of aspirant: inferior (who 
seeks personal benefit in this or future lives); middling (who seeks personal free-
dom from suffering cyclic existence); and superior (who treasures others above 
self and works toward their liberation from suffering).   
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was Rinchen Drak from Daryül. They say that although he taught ex-
tensively, nobody capable of holding his lineage appeared. The one 
equally learned in both words and meaning was Zhang Jungné Ye-
shé. He established the Dharma University in Tangsak. He relied on 
the Translator Patsap’s interlinear commentaries and outlines of the 
texts, and himself also composed various commentaries whose lin-
eage is uninterrupted up to the present day. He also taught the Root 
Wisdom, Engaging, and Four Hundred treatises, and gave guiding ex-
planations of the view of the Madhyamaka of Prāsanġika tradition. 
At the end of approximately ten generations in the lineage trans-
mitted from Zhang, there came a scholar whose name was Martön 
Zhönnu Gyeltsen. Many scholars from Ü-Tsang studied with him. He 
had lots of disciples, and the Great Lord Rongtön (1367–1449) also was 
his disciple. In later times, they say, the Noble Lord Rendawa (1349–
1412) studied the Madhyamaka of Prāsanġika tradition with the Great 
Dokdokpa. I don’t know with whom the later one had studied. Ren-
dawa wrote commentaries on the Root, Engaging, and Four Hundred 
and also composed guiding explanations of the view. The one who 
studied with him was the Great Tsongkhapa (1357–1419).
How Acceptance and Rejection of These Two Came into Being  
While Chapa was teaching and studying Svātantrika Madhyamaka, a 
holder of Candrakīrti’s lineage, the paṇḍita named Jayānanda, who 
wrote a commentary on the Engaging in the Middle Way, came to Ti-
bet. At that time Chapa directly challenged him through debate and 
indirectly challenged Prāsaṅgika followers by composing a treatise 
with a great variety of refutations of both the words and meaning of 
Candrakīrti’s treatise. Regardless of how his refutations hit the tar-
get, he definitely grasped the opponent’s point of view. 
Although at the time of the Great Translator Ngok, the Prāsanġika 
texts were not translated, by relying on their sayings (which he heard 
either in the Noble Land or in Tibet), in refuting Prāsanġika the Trans-
lator Ngok wrote a refutation of acceptance of the existence of the re-
alization of the Madhyamaka meaning without relying on the three-
moded syllogism: “Without the thought in their minds: ‘This collection 
of conditions does not exist; both those people who proclaim apparent 
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things or their perfect refusal, deviate from the path of valid cogni-
tion and definitely fall into the great empty desert of wrong views.” He 
also wrote a refutation of the followers of Yogācāra and Svātantrika 
Madhyamaka: “Both those who accept some phenomenal existence by 
the power of reasoning and those who ascertain by valid cognition the 
suchness which is beyond the way of compounded phenomena, fall 
into the mouth of the great demon of unbearable grasping at things 
and are held fast by the sharp fangs of wrong views.” As for his own 
tradition, he explained that Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka has to be un-
derstood with the help of the reasoning of the author of the Commen­
tary on Valid Cognition. 
In later times, the Great Jonangpa [Dölpopa Sherap Gyeltsen, 1292–
1361] said that what is explicitly taught as Madhyamaka in the texts 
of the master Candrakīrti belonging to the Vehicle of Reasoning is not 
suitable to be Madhyamaka, because it is the Dharma of the Age of 
Disputes. Madhyamaka is to be understood as it is explained by the 
Dharma language of Shambhala.6 This implies that Svātantrika Mad-
hyamaka cannot be interpreted in other ways either. 
Also in later times, the Great Tsongkhapa explained that no correct 
view exists in those forms of Madhyamaka that are known to be dif-
ferent from the Madhyamaka taught in texts of Glorious Candrakīrti. 
He also said that all pure views of the sūtras and tantras necessarily 
belong only to this Prāsanġika tradition.    
Shakya Chokden, Three Texts on Madhyamaka, 
trans. Yaroslav Komarovski (Dharamsala: Library of 
Tibetan Works and Archives, 2000), pp. 9-14, 21-24. 
Revised by the translator for the present publication.
6 Dölpopa’s radical teaching is treated later in this chapter. He was inspired by the 
Tantra of the Wheel of Time (Kālacakratantra), which is said to have been promul-
gated in the Inner Asian land of Shambhala.   
